enterprises capable of taking fullest advantage of the vast quantities of information that computers and the internet were making available.
After two years of research into a variety of logistics labor markets, I have seen little that confirms my hypothesis. Seafaring, longshoring, drayage, and warehousing are not for the most part high-road industries, where educated and empowered workers are able to use information to produce efficient, low-cost, on-time solutions. Rather, the power of computer-based information processing is enabling businesses to scour the world for the cheapest supplies not only of raw materials and manufactured goods, but for labor itself. And the impact of the logistics revolution is not only that it provides employers to access far-flung networks of cheap labor, it also enables them to hire labor in ways that reduce their responsibilities, their benefit obligations, their tax liabilities, their insurance costs, and their fixed costs for equipment and so on.
The logistics industry's choice of low-road labor markets comes at considerable cost. As labor economist know from long experience, low labor costs reduce the need for capital investment, new technology, and integrated systems. The low-cost labor markets of the current global logistics industry impose significant costs to global commerce in terms of uncertainty, delay, additional inventory and insurance costs, lost sales, increased discounting. The low-road labor markets also impose costs to the public in the form of wasted fuel, excess air and water pollution, worn-out roads, overstrained infrastructure, heightened public health costs, unnecessary land use and on and on. So how has this state of affairs come about?
Containerization
The containerization of global shipping, which began in the late 1950's and took two decades to complete, brought great changes to logistics labor markets throughout the world. Containerization brought down the cost of loading and unloading ships as well as the duration of the time spent loading and unloading. This dramatic change reduced the need for longshore labor as well as the time ships spent in port, burning fuel, keeping seafarers' idle, and wasting the revenue-generating capacity of the idled ship. Once containerization was in place, the cost of shipping goods long distances declined radically, which opened up the possibility for offshoring production, lengthening supply chains, reaching new customers, and bringing new sources of labor, raw materials, components, and logistics services into the realm of global trade and investment. 2 Containerization made global transportation so much cheaper that the volume of trade began to grow rapidly. As the volume of trade grew, the labor markets grew, bringing tens of thousands of workers into trucking, rail freight, warehousing and logistics services.
Containerization also changed the direction of trade, which had important implications for the location of logistics jobs. As cargo was shifted from bulk shipping to container shipping, some ports, like Philadelphia and Boston declined in significance, 
Neo-Liberalism
The ports didn't grow by themselves. The infrastructure required to handle the massive container ships was expensive, and in many cases, local businesses and governments lacked the capital to build the new terminals, erect the cranes, construct the highways, lay the tracks, and build the warehouses and distribution centers. The International Development Bank, aka the World Bank, entered the scene, offering to help local business communities and governments to raise private capital to build efficient new ports. In the age of neo-liberalism, there was a catch; the World Bank's development agenda required the new ports to adopt business and labor practices consistent with neo-liberalism: global competition for services rather than local business networks, contracting out work rather than employing workers, deregulating product and labor markets. 3 Local employers went bankrupt or were absorbed by global companies. Companies that had specialized in one branch of the logistics chain began investing in firms in connected branches of that chain. New global giants emerged, like Maersk and Cosco, which owned not only ships but terminals, trucking companies and warehouses all over the world.
The Logistics Revolution That Wasn't
In the 1990's, the development of information technology offered new possibilities to firms engaged in world trade. Computers, software programs and the internet made it possible for large shippers to become systematic about finding the cheapest freight rates and freight routes, the cheapest supplies, and the cheapest labor; furthermore, computer-powered inventory systems made it possible to integrate sales with orders, orders with shipments, shipments with deliveries.
The influx of global technology, the growth of global firms, and the development of knowledge processing technology gave rise to expectations that the labor markets of the logistics industry, which had already been transformed by containerization, would undergo a second revolution, one that would displace manual labor in favor of educated labor that could operate the larger, more technically complex systems more effectively.
Some labor researchers believe that employers face the choice of taking a "high" road or a "low" road to competitiveness. The "high road" favors a competitive strategy based on innovation and customization, and thereby requires more skilled labor, while the"low road" competitive strategy focuses on recruiting the cheapest labor, keeping down wages and labor costs, and maintaining maximum labor flexibility. 4 To illustrate the strategic choices employers in the logistics chain may take, the Most of the world's current crew of seafarers are uneducated, and they come from some of the poorest nations on earth --Bangladesh, China, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Estonia, and Latvia. Working at sea is no longer a way to see the world; when seafarers arrive at American ports, they often can't afford a visa. Even if they could afford one, their port stays are short anyway; those fortunate enough to debark have just enough time to go shopping at a local mall before they have to get back to sea.
Leaders of the global logistics industry are trying to add to the seafarers' burdens responsibility for beginning the process of unloading the ships before they get into ports. In Europe, these proposals for self-loading provoked continent wide strikes and a political mobilization by the unions before they were beaten back.
Of course, not all those involved in global shipping share the fate of these seafarers. The crews of transoceanic vessels include highly trained officers who are responsible for maintaining expensive equipment, keeping ships on course, on schedule, and in good order, maintaining communications with shipowners', shippers, and harbormasters, etc. This workforce has a different origin and a different education than the sea-farers. They ride aboard the same ships but they live in a different world.
In some ways, the story of the seafarers' emblematizes the impact of the recent revolutions in the logistics industry on its various labor markets.
Longshoring
If we turn to longshoring, which is what most people think of when they conjure up the logistics revolution, we can indeed find mighty crane operators who are lords of the docks. They pick up containers worth millions of dollars, and they put them down, gently, in a precise place, so as not to damage the equipment below. They are trained extensively and paid commensurately. If they are displeased with the terminal operators, they can reduce a busy port to chaos in a matter of hours.
The picture is not as pretty for the ordinary dockworker, who operates yard equipment, drives cars off ships, or monitors traffic at terminal gates. On the docks, technological advances, privatization and deregulation have made it possible for employers to lay off hundreds of thousands of longshoremen. The re-casualization of labor has taken place in Korea. New Zealand, and England, where longshoremen's union power has been broken. 5 In the U.S. unions have won productivity gain sharing agreements, but standards are declining, at least on East Coast where the ILA was forced to accept a nine-tier contract that has reduced pay levels and reintroduced casual work patterns for thousands of recent hires. In 2006, the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor reported that one-third of the longshoremen hired since 2003 had not worked enough hours to qualify for benefits. Some of them were receiving public assistance. 6 On the West Coast of the U.S., in the EU and in Mumbai, India, longshoremen's unions have staved off deregulation, but the numbers of longshoremen are declining despite the rapid growth in the volume of trade. 7 
Port Trucking
Until about 1980, the port trucking, or drayage industry, was a unionized sector in which truck drivers made wages comparable to those of industrial workers, with medical insurance and pension benefits. In the late 1970s, Carter/Kennedy "reforms" brought to an end the regulatory regime which limited the number of trucking companies that could operate on each delivery route, a regime that set freight rates, a regime in which port truckers were union workers with health insurance, pensions, and industrial workers' wages. Post-1981, most drayage companies ceased to be owners of trucks and employers of drivers; under the new regime, most became brokers with few assets and even fewer responsibilities towards the drivers; Their role is to take orders and schedule pick ups and deliveries from port terminals to distribution centers and warehouses, which may be as far as seventy-five miles from the ports, depending on distribution patterns, land prices and labor costs. For their role in scheduling the truck movements of their contract drivers, they receive at least one half of the freight delivery rate 8 In a generation, port trucking became a scene of destructive competition. With virtually no barriers to entry, anyone with a phone and fax machine could become a Sixty hours on congested highways in aging, diesel fume spewing trucks would be bad enough, but the daily experience of drivers is worse than that. Because independent contractors are not paid for their time, but for the load, the operators of terminals, trucking firms, distribution centers and warehouses have no incentive to invest in technology or to streamline systems so that drivers can maximize the number of deliveries they make per day. Instead, drivers wait on lines -to get through the terminal gates, to pick up the chassis on which their loads will sit, to exit the ports with their boxes inspected, to drive through bottlenecks at ramps and bridges leading to and from the port, to deliver and pick up boxes at the loading docks of dc's and warehouses. Waiting on line, losing time, breathing in diesel fumes from old, outmoded trucks leads to disabling stress, heart and lung disease and cancer, but nobody knows how much.
The fact that drivers are not paid for their waiting time takes a toll not only on their health, but on the efficiency of the logistics chain itself. Since their extra low earnings means that freight rates have remained low despite the rapid increase in shipping volumes, logistics firms have little incentive to invest in modern equipment to speed up the movement of the trucks carrying containers into and out of the ports. In most of America's ports, the chassis which carry containers are old and traffic software outdated. Freight rates are so low that it is economical for shippers to let their containers sit around at the terminal yards for up to three days awaiting pick up and delivery -and some sit even longer, accumulating late fees. These boxes take up space, and clutter the yards. Because the freight rates are so low for the containers moving slowly through the congested terminals and highways, most customers don't insist on just-in-time delivery, for which they would have to pay a premium. As a result, they James Peoples and Wayne Talley, "Owner-Operator Truck Driver Earnings and Employment: Port Cities and Deregulation," in Peoples and Talley, Transportation Labor Issues and Regulatory Reform. have higher inventory and insurance costs, and they lose potential profits when they have to discount items that arrived at the stores too late to satisfy customer demands. 10 The problems of US port truckers are shared by their brethren in Canada. At the port of Vancouver, the situation of long waiting times, low pay, and poor work conditions was so bad that the port truckers stopped work for more than six weeks in 1999. After trying a voluntary plan to improve the conditions of independent contractors for six year, the port decided in 2005 to adopt a truck licensing system, and to require that licensees hire port truckers as employees. 11 Bad as the working lives of American port truckers are, they are probably significantly better than those of most other drivers in the world's drayage markets. In China, truckers often spend half a day at a time lined up at truck stops waiting to refuel. 12 In southern Africa, drivers crossing national borders may have to wait weeks to get their travel permits approved. In India, truckers have to pay bribers to numerous government officials to gain access to highways and access roads.
In Korea, which has aspirations to be a freight center for northern Asia, port trucking is an impediment to development plans. In 2005, the Korean Minister of Labor reported that the average truck driver, who is an independent contractor, earns only 77% of the average urban workers' wage. For this, he works 80.7 hours per week, and sleeps in his truck an average of only 5.1 hours per day. Like U.S. truckers, Korean drivers suffer from the fact that their brokers take the fuel surcharges they are supposed to receive.
Warehousing
The logistics revolution has affected warehousing in that logistics service providers now have information processing capability that allows them to offer space at a wide range of costs and a wide range of distances from ports and customers.
Someone ordering a product from China now has a world of choices:
1. They can have their freight stored in China until it is needed. 2. They can have it shipped to a transshipment port, and held there until a cheap freight rate is available on a container carrier.
3. They can have it shipped on the cheapest available container carrier, and then have it stored at a terminal's yard until it is needed. 4. They can have it sent via ship to a port, and then have it warehoused near the port.
5. They can send it via a cheap ship to a distant port, and then have it transported by rail to a distant warehouse until it is needed. 6. They can ship it to a nearby port and then have it trucked to a distant distribution center until it is needed. This use of computer processing enables companies to expand their options for warehousing in much the same way as the container revolution enabled them to expand their sourcing and distribution options. Since companies have different needs, depending on their distribution networks, and the nature of the products they are distributing, they make different decisions.
Fashion sensitive garments, food, and heavy equipment tend to be warehoused near the port; general consumer merchandise that will be sold during the Christmas shopping season can be stored wherever costs are lowest.
While just-in-time delivery inventory systems became the by-word in studies of high-performance work systems in the 1990's, it appears that many shippers prefer not to make themselves vulnerable to the high labor costs, expensive capital, and possibility of delay that just-in-time systems engender.
At an import warehouse twenty-five miles from the booming port of Norfolk, trains bring containers on a regular schedule at low prices. But once the containers are in the facility, they sit undisturbed for a week at a time. Trucks arrive to pick up freight without appointments. 13 Meanwhile, in Cranbury, New Jersey, thirty miles from the ports of northern New Jersey, dozens of warehouses sit vacant even as new facilities are being built on speculation. The reason is that many shippers are finding it cheaper to store their freight fifty miles to the west, in the Lehigh Valley, or hundreds of miles to the south, in Georgia and South Carolina. Cheaper land and labor costs matter more to the bottom line than proximity to customers.
During the past decade of cheap energy, the wasted diesel fuel and unnecessary mileage were of little consequence; perhaps now that the cost of diesel fuel has skyrocketed, the algorithm will change.
The high road/low road division exists in warehousing as well as in the other logistics sectors. In Europe, the high cost of fuel, and environmental regulations have provided incentives for warehouse companies to locate near customers and ports. They compensate for high labor and land costs by building higher warehouses, which require less land, and by investing in automated picking equipment to move up and down the vertical rows. Few such warehouses have been built in America. When a warehouse can assemble a labor force from temporary agencies which recruit immigrants willing to work without health insurance or pension benefits, it doesn't pay to train labor and invest in skill-intensive equipment.
Many warehouses have fork lift trucks that direct the drivers to the exact place where their pick-up is waiting. The driver barely needs to read or speak English. While the data base and information processing system that spits out his instructions is knowledge intensive, no one in the warehouse knows how to input the data or repair the equipment. Most of the technicians are in corporate headquarters; those that aren't can be hired on a contract basis. It would be a mistake to over-generalize. In markets where goods need to be delivered on-time to customers near the ports, or where the products are heavy and expensive to transport -think industrial heating systems -the work force may be more stable, the wage mix tilted to the high side, the employers' willingness to invest in training greater. 14 However, in the last fifteen years, advances in logistics have reduced, not raised the probability that companies will choose high-road warehousing solutions. Low fuel costs, lax diesel emission standards, loose zoning, low tax rates, development subsidies have all encouraged sprawl, dispersed distribution, greenfield development, immigrant labor, and temporary labor agencies. 15 
Conclusion
In the labor markets of the logistics industry, advances in information technology, combined with deregulation and privatization, and the influx of global investment capital, have enabled employers to access ever larger tools of labor. The availability of low-cost labor discourages capital investment, reduces the incentive to coordinate links in the logistics chain, reduces demand for skills and skill development, and raises the burden that freight movement imposes on the public in the form of air pollution, traffic congestion, infrastructure degradation, fossil fuel consumption, and ecologically damaging land use. While many workers and firms suffer from their lack of bargaining power, industry leaders remain profitable despite the systems' many inefficiencies, because low wages keep labor costs and freight rates low. Changes in public policy could change this suboptimal equilibrium, but most of the organizations involved in the industry will resist such changes. In Los Angeles, a coalition of environmentalists, labor unionists, public health advocates, and faith-based organizations forced the Harbor Commission to push logistics onto the high road. It remains to be seen whether this can be a model for sustainable change.
